

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01443 01 OF 02 311652Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----102638 311714Z /47
P 311627Z JAN 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5335
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01443

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 31, 1978
(SALT TWO-1592)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JANUARY 31, 1978

- I

QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED IN THE
COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL--ON BANNING FLIGHT-TESTS OR
DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN
EXCESS OF 2,500 KILOMETERS, AND ON BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600
KILOMETERS ON SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS OR LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01443 01 OF 02 311652Z

DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON LONG-
RANGE CRUISE MISSILES CONTINUES, INCLUDING THAT PART
WHICH CONCERNS THE PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, OF
THE DRAFT TREATY, ON THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS,
AND IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT TREATY.

ESTABLISHING STRICT AND EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE

RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES MUST BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OBLIGATIONS IN THE NEW TREATY.
AT THE DECEMBER 1, 1977 MEETING THE SOVIET SIDE TABLED
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THIS CONNECTION.

THE QUESTION OF DEFINING CRUISE MISSILES AND THEIR
RANGE HAS BEEN FURTHER STUDIED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
DISCUSSIONS HELD. IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT
ON THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION IS
TABLING REVISED WORDING FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 6, OF THE
DRAFT TREATY, AND THE AGREED STATEMENT THERETO:

"PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

CRUISE MISSILES ARE ANY SELF-PROPELLED, GUIDED
MISSILES WHICH SUSTAIN THEIR FLIGHT OVER MOST OF THEIR
TRAJECTORY THROUGH THE USE OF AERODYNAMIC LIFT."

"AGREED STATEMENT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE
- TREATY

THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE
IS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE WHICH CAN BE COVERED BY THE
MISSILE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE AND WHICH IS
DETERMINED BY PROJECTING ITS FLIGHT TRAJECTORY ONTO THE
EARTH'S SURFACE."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01443 01 OF 02 311652Z

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE
PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILES
AND THEIR RANGE MUST BE CONTAINED IN THE TEXT OF THE
TREATY, SPECIFICALLY, IN ITS ARTICLE II, AND THESE
PROVISIONS WILL REMAIN IN FORCE DURING THE ENTIRE TERM
OF THE TREATY, I.E., UNTIL THE END OF 1985.

THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN THIS CONNECTION
ENSURE VERIFIABILITY OF THE CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS OF
THE SIDES BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

AS FOR AN APPROACH BASED, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE USE OF
A CRUISE MISSILE'S SO-CALLED "OPERATIONAL" RANGE AS A
CRITERION, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE JUDGEMENT
CONTAINED IN THIS CRITERION IS INDEFINITE AND ARBITRARY,
IT WOULD IN FACT PROCEED FROM A PREMISE OTHER THAN THE
ONE AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES; SPECIFICALLY, IT WOULD MEAN
THAT THE ACTUAL RANGE OF SUCH MISSILES COULD BE
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN THE AGREED LIMITS OF 600 AND
2,500 KILOMETERS. INCIDENTALLY, THIS ALSO FOLLOWS FROM
CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN HERE BY THE U.S. SIDE. IT IS
IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES RELIABLY TO PRECLUDE SUCH

A POSSIBILITY.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE REVISED NEW WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 6, AND THE AGREED STATEMENT THERETO, TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE TODAY, WILL BE CAREFULLY STUDIED.

IT WOULD APPEAR ADVISABLE TO CONTINUE FURTHER WORK ON THIS QUESTION IN THE DRAFTING GROUP, WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING UPON IT.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01443 02 OF 02 311656Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W

-----102684 311717Z /47

P 311627Z JAN 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5336

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 01443

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

- II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY, ON PROVIDING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBDIVIDING SUCH MISSILES INTO NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED MISSILES, AND ON THAT BASIS TO INTRODUCE RADICAL CHANGES TO THE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES.

HOWEVER, YOU KNOW THAT THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY DIVISION OF

CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600
KILOMETERS INTO NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED
MISSILES. THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED BY THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01443 02 OF 02 311656Z

TREATY APPLY TO ALL CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN
EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS.

THIS IS THE SUBJECT OF THE OBLIGATIONS IN
ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY, AS WELL AS OF THE OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THAT DOCUMENT, WHICH CONCERN LIMITATIONS ON
LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH PURSUANT TO ITS
ARTICLE XIX MUST REMAIN IN FORCE THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
1985

I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE A
DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A
RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, OR TO CHANGE THE TERM
OF THE AGREED OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ATTEMPTS
AT UPSETTING THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND, TO PAVING THE WAY FOR
AN UNCHECKED BUILDUP IN A NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, LIMITED UNDER THE TREATY.

SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE STATEMENTS MADE BY
THE SOVIET SIDE ON THIS SCORE AT THE MEETINGS OF
OCTOBER 27, NOVEMBER 3 AND 9, AS WELL AS DECEMBER 1 AND
16, 1977.

ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, THE SOVIET
SIDE CATEGORICALLY REJECTS ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE IN THE
DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT A PROVISION ENVISAGING A
DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR-
ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED CRUISE MISSILES, AS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES,
AND ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE. EARLE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01443 02 OF 02 311656Z

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SPEECHES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 31 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA01443
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780046-0376
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t1978015/aaaaadlb.tel
Line Count: 218
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 01ff3be2-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3754109
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 31, 1978 (SALT TWO-1592) SEMENOV STATEMENT, JANUARY 31, 1978
TAGS: PARM, (SEMENOV, V S)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/01ff3be2-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014